Europe today finds itself trapped in one of the greatest strategic contradictions of the modern era. On one hand, NATO nations are racing to rebuild their militaries, increase defense spending, and prepare for what many leaders believe will be a prolonged confrontation with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. On the other hand, Europe continues to purchase billions of dollars’ worth of Russian liquefied natural gas, providing Moscow with a steady stream of revenue even as the war in Ukraine grinds on.
History may look back on this period with disbelief. Europe is simultaneously attempting to deter Russia while continuing to finance one of the Kremlin’s most important export industries. Whether that contradiction can continue indefinitely is becoming one of the defining strategic questions of our time.
According to the reporting compiled here, European countries spent roughly €5.96 billion during just the first half of 2026 purchasing Arctic LNG from Russia’s Yamal project. The overwhelming majority of that project’s exports continued to flow into European ports. France, Belgium, and Spain remained among the largest destinations for those cargoes despite years of promises to eliminate dependence on Russian energy.
Those purchases are occurring even as NATO members commit themselves to dramatically increasing military spending. The alliance has embraced ambitious long-term defense targets, while Eastern European countries closest to Russia continue expanding their armed forces, modernizing equipment, and investing in new military infrastructure.
The irony is difficult to ignore.
Europe is paying to strengthen both sides of the same geopolitical contest.
Every euro sent to Russia strengthens its economy and a massive portion makes it to the Kremlin for defense spending. Reality inevitably strengthens Moscow’s ability to sustain military operations, modernize its armed forces, and continue prosecuting the war in Ukraine.
FAM Editor: Think in terms of the Keynesian multiplier effect. Money coming from Europe circulates widely and the value is a multiple of that revenue. Conversely, if Europe were to deny the revenue to Russia the result would be a reverse Keynesian effect – and devastating.
President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized Europe over this contradiction, arguing that Europe has spent more money purchasing Russian energy than supporting Ukraine. Whether one agrees entirely with that assessment or not, it highlights a difficult question that European leaders have struggled to answer.
If Russia truly represents Europe’s greatest security threat, why does Europe continue purchasing Russian energy?
The answer appears to lie less in politics than in economics.
For decades, Europe pursued energy policies that increasingly relied upon imported natural gas while simultaneously reducing domestic production and, in several countries, retiring nuclear generating capacity. The continent hoped that diversified imports, renewable energy, and expanded LNG infrastructure would eventually replace Russian supplies without severe economic disruption. The gains from renewable have been substantial but not nearly sufficient to wean them from Russia energy.
Instead, Russia demonstrated just how powerful energy dependence could become.
When pipeline gas supplies were reduced following the invasion of Ukraine, Europe experienced soaring energy prices, industrial disruption, factory slowdowns, and enormous economic strain. Energy-intensive industries struggled to remain competitive. Manufacturers found themselves paying dramatically higher electricity prices than competitors in the United States and elsewhere.
Those experiences help explain why European governments have found it politically difficult to impose an immediate and comprehensive cutoff of Russian LNG.
Officials argue that many purchases remain locked into long-term contracts scheduled to expire in 2027. Others point to concerns about maintaining stable energy supplies during the transition toward alternative sources.
Those explanations may be technically accurate.
Yet they do little to eliminate the underlying contradiction. Russia understands this leverage exceptionally well.
The Kremlin has demonstrated repeatedly that energy can be used as a geopolitical weapon. Pipeline shutdowns, supply reductions, and pricing pressure reminded European governments that modern economies remain deeply dependent upon reliable energy supplies.
Putin has recognized that Europe’s dependence buys Russia something almost as valuable as natural gas revenue itself: time.
Every month that Europe delays fully ending Russian LNG purchases represents another month of export income flowing into Moscow. Every year that long-term contracts remain in force extends Russia’s financial breathing room while Europe races to rebuild military capabilities that many experts acknowledge had been neglected for decades.
That rebuilding effort is substantial.
Countries such as Poland, Romania, Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic states have accelerated military procurement and increased defense spending. Germany has begun expanding its defense industrial base after years of underinvestment. NATO leaders hope these investments will ultimately create a stronger, more self-sufficient European defense posture capable of deterring future Russian aggression.
Those initiatives are necessary.
But deterrence becomes less convincing when Europe continues sending billions of euros to the very government it seeks to deter.
Critics will argue that the situation is more complicated than simply shutting off Russian gas tomorrow. They are correct.
Europe must keep homes heated, factories operating, and electrical grids functioning while alternative infrastructure comes online. Abrupt disruptions could produce economic shocks that weaken European unity even further.
Still, complexity does not erase contradiction.
The European Union has already approved legislation that phases out remaining Russian LNG imports under long-term contracts beginning in 2027, with broader prohibitions following later that year. That timetable reflects Europe’s recognition that dependence on Russian energy is strategically unacceptable.
Europe has already learned that energy dependence creates political dependence. Whoever controls critical energy supplies possesses leverage that extends far beyond economics. Russia used that leverage before the invasion of Ukraine and continues to benefit from it today.
The uncomfortable truth is that Europe cannot fully claim economic independence, strategic independence, or even military independence while substantial portions of its energy system continue financing an adversary’s export economy.
Ultimately, Europe faces a simple but uncomfortable choice.
It can continue accepting the economic pain associated with breaking free from Russian energy, or it can continue accepting the strategic risks that accompany dependence on a supplier it increasingly views as its principal geopolitical rival.
History suggests that postponing difficult decisions rarely makes them less expensive.
Europe’s military buildup will ultimately matter less than its willingness to eliminate the financial relationship that continues providing Moscow with billions in export revenue. Until that contradiction is resolved, Europe will remain engaged in the remarkable spectacle of preparing to defend itself from a threat that it continues, however indirectly, to help finance.
